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Project Participants
Senior Personnel
Name: Acheson, James
Worked for more than 160 Hours: Yes
Contribution to Project: 
James Acheson's involvement in the project did not change.  He supervised the project staff and is carried out all of the sub project
goals outlined in the proposal. With the unexpected death of Roy Gardiner in January 2011, he had to assume additional
responsibilities with regard to jointly-authored articles that were in preparation and under review for publication.
Name: Acheson, Ann
Worked for more than 160 Hours: Yes
Contribution to Project: 
Ann Acheson did the tasks described in the original proposal.  In addition, she supervised the administration and data entry for the
lobster fisherman survey, a task she assumed due to reallocation of  time availability of the staff person at the Margaret Chase
Smith Policy Center who had originally been scheduled to do this. This past year she has been involved in analysis, write-up of
results, and editing of project publications.
Post-doc
Graduate Student
Name: Snyder, Robert
Worked for more than 160 Hours: Yes
Contribution to Project: 
Robert Snyder, a Ph.D. candidate at York University, received his degree in 2009. For this project, he interviewed
groundfishermen and did ethnographic fieldwork in the fishing communities of the Saint George Peninsula, Maine (south of
Rockland). He also interviewed officers of the groundfishing lobbying organizations in New England, including the Penobscot East
Fishermen's Association, the Mid-Coast Fishermen's Association, the Gloucester Seafood Coalition and the Chatham,
Massachusetts Hook Fishermen's Association. He was paid from project funds in the first year of the grant. He did not work on the
project this last year (20010-11).
Undergraduate Student
Name: Martin, Michelle
Worked for more than 160 Hours: No
Contribution to Project: 
Michelle Martin did a great deal of work on the groundfish survey.  She stuffed envelopes for our mail survey, called fishermen,
and entered data in SPSS when the survey forms were returned.  She also did a good deal of archival work on the history of
groundfish management using newspapers, primarily Commercial Fisheries News.  She analyzed data from the survey and archival
study and used some of these data in her undergraduate Honors thesis.  She received highest honors for this thesis.  Michelle was
paid, in part, from project funds. Her work on this project ended in 2009.
Technician, Programmer
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Other Participant
Name: Gardner, Roy
Worked for more than 160 Hours: No
Contribution to Project: 
Roy Gardner (Professor of Economics, Indiana University) was involved in organizing and running the  experimental games
portion of our project.  He supervised Dymtro Zhosan, then one of his graduate students in Economics at Indiana University, who
was also involved in this part of the study. The experimental games session with fishermen was carried out January 9, 2009.  Dr.
Gardner ran one of the two groups at that session.  Since that time, he did part of the analysis of the data, and co-authored three
articles with James Acheson and one with Dymtro Zhosan. He was paid from project funds as a consultant. Roy Gardner died
unexpectedly on January 10, 2011.
Name: Zhosan, Dymtro
Worked for more than 160 Hours: No
Contribution to Project: 
Dima Zhosan was involved in the experimental games section of the project.  He spent the fall of 2008 organizing the materials
and computer program for the games session.  On January 9, he was involved in running one of the groups at the experimental
games session with lobster fishermen and groundfishermen. Data from these games sessions were used in his Ph.D. dissertation.
He also conducted additional experimental games with students from Bates College and Ripon College.  He was paid from project
funds as a consultant.
Research Experience for Undergraduates
Organizational Partners
Other Collaborators or Contacts
Most of our efforts this last project year have gone to collaborating with each other (i.e., other people on this project) to get the results of our
research analyzed and written up for publication. 

Carl Wilson, who is the head lobster biologist for the State of Maine, and James Acheson are working on a joint article to bring together data
that was collected on the lobster industry during the course of this project with data that Wilson collected in a 2009 survey of the lobster
industry sponsored by the Maine Department of Marine resources.

Of course we have had contact with hundreds of groundfishermen,  lobster fishermen and personnel of the Regional Council, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, and the Maine Department of Marine resources.  All of these people served as key informants; they were not
collaborators in the usual sense of the word.
Activities and Findings
Research and Education Activities: (See PDF version submitted by PI at the end of the report)
Findings: (See PDF version submitted by PI at the end of the report)
Training and Development:
The students involved in this project have learned a good many research skills. Robert Snyder (Ph.D., Social Anthropology, York University)
has done a great deal of key informant interviewing and has administered  surveys to groundfishermen. Dymtro Zhosan (Ph.D., Economics,
Indiana University)gained experience in organizing and running a big experimental games session. Both used data from this project in their
dissertations. Both have completed their degrees. Zhosan defended his dissertation in the summer of 2009, and Snyder had his defense in
September 2009. University of Maine undergraduate Michelle Martin did all of the jobs involved in survey research (mailing, calling
respondents for follow-up, data entry), and has done a good deal of archival research; she received Highest Honors in May 2009 for her
undergraduate Anthropology Honors thesis. Four other undergraduate work-study students played an important role in processing and tracking
lobster fishermen survey forms and entering the data, learning to use several different programs in the process: EPI Info, Excel and Access;
they also learned a good deal about research methods in the process.
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Outreach Activities:
James Acheson and Carl Wilson, lobster biologist in the Maine Department of Marine Resources, are engaged in comparing and contrasting
research results obtained in two separate studies of the lobster industry done in 2008-2009. They hope to publish a paper on this work soon. 
    Robert Snyder, who works for the Island Institute, has kept that organization abreast of our activities.  
    Two short articles about our research have appeared, both authored by reporters. One was in a University of Maine magazine, 'Coming Up
Empty,' by Aimee Dolloff, UMaine Today, Winter 2009. http://www.umaine.edu/magazine/past-issues/winter-2009/coming-up-empty/   The
other was in a printed and on-line newspaper geared toward the fishing industry, 'The Fishermen's Dilemma: NE Management Declared
Disaster,' by Laurie Schreiber, Fisherman's Voice, June 2010, Vol. 15(6). http://www.fishermensvoice.com/index.html
    Normally, social scientists do not publish in fisheries management articles. We have several articles published or coming out in journals
where they will be seen by large numbers of fisheries managers. In the near future we will make an effort to get findings of this project
publicized in places where fishermen, resource managers and members of the legislature will see them.
Journal Publications
James Acheson and Roy Gardner, "The Evolution of Conservation Rules and Norms in the Maine Lobster Industry.", Ocean and Coastal
Management, p. 524-534, vol. 53, (2010). Published,  
James Acheson, "Co-Management in the Maine Lobster Industry: A Study in Factional Politics", Conservation and Society, p. , vol. , (2011).
Accepted,  
James M. Acheson and Roy Gardner, "The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-notch Practice: Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game",
Ecology and Society, p. 41, vol. 16, (2011). Published,  http://www.ecologyandsociety. org/vol16/iss1/art41/
James M. Acheson, "Coming Up Empty: Management Failure of the New England Groundfishery", MAST (Maritime Studies), p. 57-86, vol.
10, (2011). Published,  
James Acheson and Roy Gardner, "Modeling Disaster: Management Failure of the Gulf of Maine Groundfishery", North American Journal of
Fisheries Management, p. , vol. , (2011). Accepted,  
James M. Acheson and Ann Acheson, "Factions, Models and Resource Regulation: Prospects for Lowering the Maine Lobster Trap LimitT",
Human Ecology, p. 587-598, vol. 38, (2011). Published,  
Dymtro Zhosan and Roy Gardiner, "Problems of the Commons: Group Behavior, Cooperation and Punishment in a Two Harbor Experiment",
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, p. , vol. , (2011). Submitted,  
James M. Acheson, "Ostrom for Anthropologists", International Journal of the Commons, p. , vol. , (2011). Accepted,  
James M. Acheson and Roy Gardner, "Failure and Success in Fisheries Management in the Gulf of Maine",  Rationality and Society, p. , vol. ,
(2011). Submitted,  
Books or Other One-time Publications
James Acheson, "Cooperation and the Development of Conservation Law: The Case of the Maine Lobster Industry", (2010). Book, Published
Editor(s): Robert Marshall
Collection: Cooperation, Hierarchy and Social Life
Bibliography: Altamira Press
James Acheson, "The Future of the Maine Lobster Industry", (2010). Conference proceedings, publication staus undetermined as yet
Editor(s): Gulf of Maine Lobster Foundation
Collection: Do not know at present
Bibliography: Publisher not yet determined
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James Acheson, "Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry", (2009). conference proceedings, publication status not yet determined
Editor(s): Not yet determined
Collection: Not yet determined
Bibliography: Pew Fellowship Program Meeting, Sebasco Estates, Maine Oct 16, 2009
Web/Internet Site
Other Specific Products
Product Type:
Meeting presentation
Product Description:
Paper presented at Experimental Games Workshop, Atlanta, GA, June 2009. Author: Dymtro Zhosan. Title: "Problem of the Commons: Group
Behavior, Cooperation and Punishment in a Two-Harbor Experiment."
Sharing Information:
Presentation will be further refined and submitted for publication.
Contributions
Contributions within Discipline: 
One of our major objectives was to contribute to the literature on how and why rules are developed. This is a very basic question in the social
sciences, and one that has not been adequately answered. There is, in fact, no consensus, on the reasons rules come into being and the
mechanisms involved. This project has allowed us to contribute to this very important body of ideas at the forefront of the social sciences. It
also has some practical implications because it is very important to devise rules to effectively conserve resources in a world where resources are
being over-exploited at a rapid rate. In the second and third years of the project we concentrated on writing up the data from our research to
produce several articles on the factors promoting effective conservation legislation in the lobster industry and blocking the development of such
rules in the groundfishery.  We have used an evolutionary game theory model to analyze the data used in these articles.  I believe our bringing
together data and evolutionary models to understand the solution to the prisoner's dilemma problem faced by both of these industries will be a
unique contribution of this research project.

To date, we have made several specific contributions to these ends. 
(1) James Acheson and Roy Gardner have written two articles explaining the failure of groundfish management ('Coming up Empty' and
'Modeling Disaster').  We show that a large number of variables have raised the costs of developing high quality rules making it impossible for
the groundfishing industry to solve the prisoner's dilemma they face.  
(2) Two articles have been written using our model on the evolution of the conservation ethic in the lobster industry (J. Acheson 'Evolution of
Conservation Rules and Norms in the Maine Lobster Industry' and J. Acheson and R. Gardiner 'The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch
practice: Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma').
(3) James Acheson has written 'Co-management in the Maine Lobster Industry: a Study in Factional Politics,' documenting the progress of the
all-important Lobster Zones Management governance system--one of the best co-management systems in the world. This article specifically
mentions the problems that this governance system has overcome to obtain conservation rules, and those remaining to be solved.    
(4) James and Ann Acheson have written 'Factions, Politics and Resource Regulation,' documenting the ongoing efforts to get stricter trap
limits for the Maine lobster industry. 
(5) Robert Snyder's work documents the way in which groups of fishermen have self organized to develop additional markets, and, in the
process, have come to lobby for more restrictive management rules. 
(6) Dymtro Zhosan's work on experimental games suggests that cultural differences influence the way that lobstermen and groundfishermen
played these games. Moreover the decisions of fishermen are different from those of students playing the same games, which again emphasizes
that experience and cultural differences influence cooperation.

All of these efforts should serve to show anthropologists how evolutionary games and rational choice theory can be applied to problems of
interest to anthropologists.
Contributions to Other Disciplines: 
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Our research makes contributions to three bodies of literature.

(1) Our work on the problem of how rules are developed will be of interest to the large number of social scientist from anthropology,
economics, sociology and political science interested in rational choice theory and evolutionary game theory. Many have a major interest in
understanding the circumstances under which people cooperate to devise rules to regulate the use of natural resources.
 
(2) Our work on successes and failures of fisheries management will be of interest to all those concerned with practical aspects of fisheries
management. Many efforts to manage fisheries sustainably have failed. If managers are going to improve their performance, it is crucial to
know what has worked, what efforts have failed, and why.  Our work on lobster management provides a case study of successful management.
Our case study on the management of the groundfishery provides sobering study in management failure.
     
(3) Roy Gardner and Dymtro Zhosan's work has contributed to the economics literature on coordination and common-pool resource
appropriation problems by using experimental games with students, lobster fishermen and groundfishermen.  Their work has demonstrated that
there is evidence to support the ideas that lobster fishermen behave differently than groundfishermen.  More specifically, their experiments
provide evidence for 3 of 4 of our hypotheses concerning cooperation in allocating a common-pool resource. They also found that people who
have real-life experience in fisheries behave differently in the experimental games than students who participated in similar games in a
university setting. Culture and experience influence the ability to solve collective action dilemmas.  
    Game theorists usually operate as if people are relatively uniform and respond only to differences in circumstances. Cultural differences are
generally not considered.  The results of Zhosan and Gardner's experimental games strongly suggest that culture plays a key role in common
pool resource allocational decisions.
Contributions to Human Resource Development: 
The project has provided financial support and experience to two advanced Ph.D. candidates, one in Anthropology (as a research assistant,
primarily doing interviewing of fishermen and officials of fishermen's organizations), and the other in Economics (as a consultant, doing game
theory experiments with students, lobstermen and groundfishermen). One undergraduate student received financial support and participated in
data collection and analysis, resulting in an Honors thesis in Anthropology. Four other undergraduate students were employed through the
work-study program to process surveys and do data entry for the large-scale lobster fisherman survey, where they learned to use a data-entry
program (EPI-INFO)and databases (Access and Excel).
Contributions to Resources for Research and Education: 
No contributions to physical, institutional and information resources for research and education.
Contributions Beyond Science and Engineering: 
When the publications from this project appear, we will make sure they are made available to people involved in fisheries management (i.e.,
legislature, agency personnel, leaders of the fishing industry). We hope that this will result in changes in fisheries management practices and
policies.  If it does nothing else, it should help government agencies and industry groups avoid some of the mistakes they have made in the past.
Conference Proceedings
Categories for which nothing is reported: 
Organizational Partners
Any Web/Internet Site
Any Conference
ACTIVITIES 
 
We have done several separate sets of activities connected to our four project components.  
 
(1) Study of Current Social Organization and Culture.  We carried out two mail surveys: (a) 
a survey of groundfishermen in which we had a return of 110 survey forms (out of about 600); 
(b) a study of lobster fishermen, from whom we received 702 forms (from a sample of 3,000). 
We also did a good deal of key informant interviewing with people in both of these industries.  
We collected a good deal of data on attitudes towards conservation and current problems in these 
industries. 
 In addition, during the course of analysis of groundfish data, a number of questions came 
to the fore and several gaps in our information became apparent. James Acheson contacted 21 
agency personnel and New England Regional Fisheries Management Council members (past and 
present) to get additional information on these issues. 
 In the third year of the project, 129 lobster fishermen who returned the 2009 lobster 
survey and said they would be amenable to giving additional information were interviewed over 
the phone. They were asked to comment on four issues of current importance in the industry. 
These were: (1) their views on a stricter trap limit; (2) the operations of the zone management 
system; (3) current economic problems; and (4) their views on offshore wind power. These 
interviews were very successful and the data collected will be used in future publications. 
(2) The History Study.  On this project we did a lengthy study of groundfish management over 
the course of the past 40 years, using the archives of the Maine Commercial Fisherman and 
Commercial Fisheries News. We also did key informant interviews with past and present 
officials involved with groundfish management and officers of fishermen's organizations. We 
completed our study of the history of lobster management. This included key informant 
interviews with 21 older lobster fishermen who were between 85 and 100 years old. We also did 
a substantial work in the Maine State Archives. In the Archives, we focused especially on the 
“Correspondence of the Commissioner” and Department of Marine Resources Annual Reports.  
(3) Experimental Games. The experimental sessions were conducted at multiple locations 
starting in 2009.  On January 9, 2009 a session involving a population of professional Maine 
lobstermen and groundfishermen was held at The Darling Marine Center of the University of 
Maine. Dymtro Zhosan and Roy Gardner ran this session. The experiments went very well. 
These data were analyzed by Zhosan and Gardner.  Dymtro Zhosan ran other sessions involving 
students at Bates College and Ripon College at later dates. The additional data for the 
experimental game project was collected from Ripon College students in the spring and summer 
of 2011 to augment the number of game runs done in the earlier sessions. This was done to 
satisfy reviewers of the article submitted to the Journal of Environmental Management and 
Economics.   
(4) Evolutionary Game Theory. We have used a three parameter model developed by Roy 
Gardner to bring together our experiments with the historical data and ethnography to understand 
the factors involved in affecting conservation legislation in the lobster and groundfish industries.  
This part of the project resulted in a good deal of information on the factors influencing the 
differential development of conservation rules and norms in the lobster and groundfish 
industries.  
FINDINGS 
 
 The objective of this project was to explain the differential success of the Maine lobster 
industry, where catches in recent years have been at record highs, with that of the groundfish 
industry where catches and stock levels have been very low. Our studies show that that the 
essential difference is that the lobster industry has a conservation ethic which has allowed it to 
develop rules to control fishing effort; the groundfish industry has not been able to do this. This 
takes us into one of the most important questions facing social scientists—namely under what 
conditions do groups of people develop norms and rules and why they do so. We have 
approached this question from the perspective of rational choice theory and evolutionary game 
theory.  Not only has this body of theory illuminated our case study and historical material, but 
we have been able to make some contribution to these bodies of ideas.  
 Our data and analysis indicate that a very large number of interactive factors played a 
role in developing a conservation ethic in the lobster and impeding the development of such an 
ethic in the groundfish industry.  Among the most important are:  fishing  effort and catch levels; 
industry support for new rules and enforcement of them; industry heterogeneity; industry 
consensus on policies; bureaucratic complexity and delay; technical and biological factors of the 
respective fisheries; science and the views of fishermen; and the scale at which management is 
attempted. 
 I will first describe the history of the way that rules developed in the lobster industry and 
then describe the reasons rules did not develop in the groundfishing industry. After this I will 
describe the model we developed to account for these facts in general terms.  Then I will go 
deeper into the evolutionary theory to explain the events in these two industries.  
 
Historical and Ethnographic Perspective 
 The development of a conservation ethic in the lobster industry was the result of an 
evolutionary process in which a number of interactive variables worked to move the industry 
from a pirate ethic to the conservation ethic. In the early years of the 20th century, many 
fishermen, perhaps the vast majority, adhered to the pirate ethic. They took short lobsters in large 
numbers and scrubbed the eggs off egg-bearing females. The pirate ethic was reinforced by the 
additional income violators received from the short lobster trade. Those who obeyed the law 
sacrificed income, and those who tried to uphold the law were sanctioned. Under these 
conditions, many fishermen ceased to obey the law in an effort to get their share. Fishermen 
assumed that exploitation by humans did little to damage the resource.  
 The lobster bust of the 1930s was a catastrophe for the lobster industry, causing 40 
percent of the lobster fishermen to go out of business. It buttressed a message that Commissioner 
Horatio Crie and biologist Francis Herrick had been preaching for years—namely that the 
industry was damaging the resource by illegal activity and that a double-gauge law was needed 
to protect the breeding stocks. As the Depression wore on, increasing numbers of fishermen 
became convinced that piracy was seriously damaging the stock—a process that Henrich and 
Henrich (2007) call “cultural learning.” An increasing cascade of fishermen began to report 
violators of the law, which made the wardens more effective. This resulted in more convictions 
and led to the end to the massive interstate trade in illegal lobsters (Acheson and Gardner 2010)  
This change in attitudes concerning the benefits of conservation also increased support 
for the double-gauge law to the point where the legislature was finally able to pass it in 1933. A 
shift in the number of people favoring a particular course of action can have a decisive effect on 
the development of rules. In the early decades of the 20th century, there was not enough industry 
support to pass the double-gauge law. By the 1930s enough fishermen had become convinced 
that illegal activity was damaging the stock and support for the double-gauge law increased 
sharply by 1933. This, in turn, led to the formation of a powerful coalition of fishermen, tourist-
industry representatives, the commissioner of the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries, and 
legislators. They won in the legislative arena against a less powerful coalition of fishermen who 
wanted to maintain the high minimum size measure. The passage of the double-gauge law is a 
classic example of the process described by Knight—a case where a rule came about in the 
aftermath of an acrimonious distribution fight over who would get the resource. As Knight 
(1992) predicts, the more powerful faction won.  
By the end of the 1930s, there was an increase in catches. Many fishermen and biologists 
credited the decline in illegal activity and the double gauge for the catch increase. This 
reinforced the idea that the secret of lobster conservation was conserving the breeding stock. 
After World War II, returning veterans gave conservation a push forward by voluntarily 
supporting the V-notch practice, which put even more large females in a sanctuary category. 
[The law states that no egg-bearing female may be taken. When a fisherman catches an egged 
female he may put a notch in her tail. That animal may not be taken as long as the notch lasts, 
which may be several molts. This is a voluntary program, since no one knows whether you have 
done this. Thousands of fishermen do it. Fishermen generally believe that the V-notch practice is 
the backbone of lobster conservation.] The result was that lobster catches increased and then 
stabilized at approximately 20 million pounds per year after 1947. Many fishermen began to 
operate with a low-discount-rate strategy as they became increasingly convinced that investing in 
lobster conservation rules would benefit them with higher future catches (Acheson and Gardner 
2010).  
 In recent decades, the upward spiral continued. In the 1970s, efforts to get an escape vent 
bill received support of a majority of fishermen, and in the late 1990s, efforts to get trap limits 
and limited entry rules for the lobster zones were passed with huge majority votes (Acheson and 
Gardner 2010). The lobster industry played a key role in the passage of all of these new laws. By 
2009, the vast majority of fishermen had become convinced that the conservation rules were 
working (see Acheson and Gardner 2010). Although not the majority, a large percentage of 
fishermen favor even stricter trap limits than the trap limit rules in place in their zones. In 
summary, the upward spiral to a conservation ethic in the lobster fishery was fueled by the 
passage of rules, more enforcement, and increasing catches. This led lobster fishermen to a 
conviction that they knew how the ocean worked, a low-discount-rate strategy, and a conviction 
that more rules were in their interest.  They supported the development of such rules. 
While lobster management is quite successful, our studies found two areas where lobster 
management might be improved. First, the co-management system (i.e., the zone management 
system) has failed to address several important problems in the past few years. I analyze the 
factors affecting the performance of the co-management system in an article (Acheson in press).  
Second, there is reason to believe that stricter trap limits would result in considerable savings in 
fuel, bait and labor. Many lobstermen understand this and support a stricter trap limit; others, 
paradoxically, do not in spite of the gains it would bring them (Acheson and Acheson 2010).    
The groundfishery presents a picture of failure.  From 1977 to the present, a number of 
different management plans, ranging from quotas and gear restrictions to seasons, closed areas, 
days at sea, and sectors, have been tried on the New England groundfishery. Unfortunately, 
nothing seems to have worked (Acheson 2011).  
When management of groundfish began in 1977 after the passage of the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management act, the stocks were already low and fishing pressure was high. 
After imposition of the Hague Line in 1984 American boats could no longer fish on the Grand 
Banks, in the gulf of Saint Lawrence and parts of Georges Bank where they had fished for 
centuries.   Many of them switched to fishing throughout the year in the Gulf of Maine, further 
devastating the stocks in that a region. Fishing pressure on the stocks was increased further by 
the federal loan programs designed to build up the US fleet (Acheson 2011). Furthermore, the 
unselective fishing technology and fish biology leads to high mortality of caught fish.  
Since fishermen did not choose the rules governing the groundfishery and perceived the 
rules as costly, unenforceable, ineffective, and based on a false scientific model, they responded 
with opposition, lawsuits, and illegal activity. This opposition, combined with bureaucratic 
complexity and jurisdictional disputes within the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
caused the New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) to stall in imposing effective 
rules (Apollonio and Dykstra 2008). Delay was probably deadly. 
Groundfishermen have a short-term perspective, and nothing in the institutional structure 
of the management regime gives them an incentive to invest in high-quality conservation rules.  
Faced with falling stocks and ineffective management, they are not inclined to invest in 
conservation rules that have no assurance of working. Rather, they focus on staying in business 
in the short run and hope stocks will not be unduly damaged by fishing. Widespread cheating 
further undermines conservation efforts; those who conserve fish are sacrificing, while the 
rewards are being taken by the “free riders.” 
New England groundfish management follows a familiar pattern. Scientists issue a stock 
assessment indicating that the stocks have fallen and tighter regulations are needed. The NEFMC 
and NMFS, after years of deliberations and negotiations, put out new regulations, which are 
strongly opposed by the industry. After a time, the regulations prove ineffective, stocks decline 
further, and the pattern is repeated. The failure reinforces the groundfishermen’s opinions about 
the poor quality of science and the ineffectiveness of the rules. A gold-rush mentality, cheating, 
ineffective regulations, political opposition, and stock decline follow each other in an ever more 
desperate downward spiral.  
Both fishermen and the management bureaucracy must share the blame for this failure. 
Who is to blame for this downward spiral?  The NEFMC and NMFS made mistakes, and the 
groundfishermen generally responded in ways to block effective management rules whenever 
possible.   
Why has the New England groundfish industry failed so far to develop high quality rules 
to conserve the stocks of fish?  There are four different factors involved, which I will describe 
below, in very general terms. One is the balance of benefits of investing in a better quality rule 
that would conserve fish as opposed to the costs of doing so. In the groundfish industry, the 
benefits of devising high quality rules are lower than the costs. Under these conditions, people 
have a strong incentive to play the dominant strategy, and block efforts of the NEFMC to pass 
more stringent rules. In the lobster industry the benefits of a high quality rule are higher than the 
costs, which lead to a willingness to devise better rules and enforce them.  
There are several different kinds of factors that influence fishermen’s assessment of the 
costs and benefits of cooperation. Two of the most important I will discuss here, and the others 
when I discuss the evolutionary model below. One set of factors affects the time horizons of 
fishermen.  As a general principle, if it is unlikely that resources will be there in the future or if 
investment in resources will not bring future benefits, there is little incentive to sacrifice current 
harvests for future rewards. Rational-choice theorists have long recognized that a high discount 
rate lowers the willingness of people to get rules and invest in the preservation of a resource 
(Ostrom 1990). 
There are a number of factors that make it rational for groundfishermen to have a very 
short time horizon. One is the fact that there is a good deal of illegal activity in the fishery which 
makes it less likely that one will receive a benefit from conservation rules. Another is a long 
history of declining catches, which reminds fishermen that tomorrow’s catches are likely to be 
less than those one gets today. A third is lack of faith in science which fishermen believe means 
that the stocks are not likely to improve. Last is the need of fishermen for income now to pay off 
mounting debts. Many fishermen, in short, cannot afford to invest in the future of the fishery 
given the high costs and low benefits such an action would entail. Under these circumstances, 
one is only being rational to take all the fish possible as fast as possible. Why sacrifice present 
gains when you believe the fishery is in inexorable decline, and neither you nor your children 
will reap the benefit of any sacrifices made (Acheson and Gardner in press)? 
 It should be noted that some factions did try, on occasion, to get such rules. 
Groundfishermen worked to get what they considered high quality rules in framing the first 
attempt to get the first comprehensive groundfish plan in 1985, but NMFS “disapproved” this 
plan (Acheson and Gardiner in press). Some factions of fishermen tried to negotiate rules when 
amendments 13 and 16 were being developed. Most were badly frustrated (Hall-Arber 2006; 
Snyder 2006). Most of the time, fishermen resisted attempts to manage their fishery. Given their 
perception that the NEFMC’s efforts to manage their fishery are likely to produce little, their 
actions have a certain logic. 
In the lobster industry, by way of contrast, there is good compliance with the law and 
comparatively little illegal activity; lobster catches have been stable since 1947 save for the past 
20 years when catches have been at historic highs; and generally the lobster fishing industry has 
experienced good profit margins, motivating a general move into the industry.  Moreover, the 
lobster industry has a good deal of faith that the existing laws are working so that future catches 
will be good.  They have a long time horizon (see Acheson and Gardner 2010: 530). 
Another set of factors influencing the willingness to support the development of high 
quality conservation laws are transaction costs. That is, not all costs and benefits are monetary. 
Some involve the time and effort to get rules to conserve resources (Williamson 1986). It is 
axiomatic among rational-choice theorists that characteristics of the community influence 
transaction costs and thus play an important role in the development of norms and rules. People 
will be more likely to provide themselves with rules leading to joint benefits if they know each 
other’s past performance, if the game is played repeatedly, and if the rules can be enforced 
(Elster 1989; North 1990; Ostrom 1990, 2000a, 2000b; Taylor 1990; Knight 1992). Under these 
circumstances, people know who is likely to cooperate, can monitor behavior, and can sanction 
free riders. For this reason, norms and rules are more likely to be produced by people in small, 
homogenous communities with a long history and a sense of community (Ostrom 2000a).  
Lobster fishing is highly territorial so that these fishermen spend their working lives in a small 
area of ocean which they exploit jointly with a small group of fishermen from nearby harbors. 
These fishermen know each other very well and they are able to monitor each other closely.  This 
helps to make lobster conservations rules self enforcing.  
The groundfish industry has virtually none of the community characteristics that lower 
transaction costs. Fishermen are scattered throughout New England and constitute a loose social 
network. Most do not know many other people in the industry, and they do not form a 
community with a long history.  
Transaction costs are also affected by industry heterogeneity. The groundfishery is highly 
heterogeneous.  People fish for different species with different types of gear from different size 
boats at sea for different lengths of time. There is also ethnic heterogeneity (Doeringer et. al. 
1986). As a result of these several types of heterogeneity, it is impossible for the industry to 
frame conservation rules informally. It is also impossible for government agencies to generate 
rules that everyone considers fair. Different factions have lobbied the NEFMC to get rules that 
benefit them at the expense of other factions. There is nothing unusual in this situation (see 
Knight 1992), but these factional disputes have made it impossible for the industry to present a 
united front and have caused a good deal of conflict during the process of developing regulations 
in the NEFMC. (See Acheson 2011 for more on the development of New England groundfish 
management regulations.) All of these factors have lowered the benefits to be obtained from 
investing in more effective conservation rules.  
The lobster industry, by way of contrast, is highly homogenous.  The boats are 
approximately the same size, everyone uses lobster traps baited with fish remnants, and the boats 
are equipped with hydraulic haulers and much the same kinds of electronic gear. As a result, 
rules will generally affect all lobster fishermen in a region in much the same ways, making it 
much easier to come to consensus on the desirability of a given proposed rule.  
Transaction costs are also raised by the top-down nature of the management system in 
place. Rational-choice theorists have considerable evidence that effective resource-management 
rules arise if local-level communities have a hand in developing the rules (Ostrom 2000b). 
People who play a role in developing resource-management rules will promulgate rules they 
consider effective in conserving the resource when they do not impose undue costs. Such rules 
can be self-enforcing (Ostrom 2000a). There is a growing body of evidence that top-down 
management does not work well (Acheson 2006). The rules to manage the groundfishery were 
put in place by the NEFMC, which was pushed in many directions by a variety of groups and 
organizations. To be sure, industry factions have tried mightily to influence the NEFMC and the 
rules it promulgated. However, the NMFS, judges, the U.S. Congress, scientists, and 
conservationists have also had a great deal of influence.  Some very important parts of the 
groundfish plan (i.e., amendments) were the result of lawsuits by conservation organizations, and 
others were motivated by the finding of federal scientists.  At one point, the fate of Amendment 
13 was in the hands of a federal judge. This is the antithesis of bottoms-up management. 
Fishermen trying to lobby for better rules have spent enormous amounts of time and effort with 
little to show for it. Again, this raised the costs of working for rules that would be acceptable to 
the industry and reduced the benefits of such an effort. The industry has resorted to trying to stall 
the imposition of stricter rules by the NEFMC. 
In the Maine lobster industry the rules were put in place by the legislature, usually in 
response to heavy lobbying in the lobster industry (Acheson 2003, Acheson and Gardner 2010). 
If the industry is united against a bill, it will not be enacted into law. Since 1995, many important 
rules (i.e., fishing times, limited entry, trap limits) are put in place by zone councils, elected by 
the lobster fishermen in each of seven areas along the coast. These councils propose referenda.  
If the proposed rule or rule change passes with 2/3 of the vote, it becomes part of the regulations 
of the department of Marine resources and is enforced by the warden force.   
 
 
Experimental Games 
 Originally, we had hoped that the results of the games experiments would demonstrate 
that there was a cultural difference between lobster fishermen, who have conservation ethic, and 
groundfishermen, who do not.  Our experiments did support this initial supposition, but not as 
strongly as we’d hoped.  Several hypotheses were tested in the experimental setting. 
First, we hypothesized that the introduction of an enforced (through a moving cost) 
geographic separation in the game would increase the appropriation efficiency on the commons 
even without an outside authority assigning the subjects to specific areas. While final 
experiments to complete the testing of this hypothesis are currently being conducted, the data to 
date allow us to conclude that introducing the enforced separation increases the efficiency 
significantly in a simulated CPR environment. Just by solving the coordination problem with five 
people fishing in one area and three people fishing in another area, the subjects were able to 
achieve a level of efficiency of at least 75%, and the average efficiencies were around 80% - 
much higher than in experiments with no separation. Also, once reached, the 5-3 allocations 
were quite stable with subjects seldom trying to move to a different area, even if the other area 
had a slightly higher payoff. 
Second, we hypothesized that introducing communication within fishing areas would 
increase efficiency significantly. While this is a known result in the literature, the increase in 
efficiencies we obtained was much higher than any previously reported, with efficiencies 
increasing to close to 100% across all groups – students and professional fishermen. Since most 
of the groups were able to achieve high cooperation levels and maintain them without a typically 
observed decrease in cooperation close to the end of a session, we can conclude that by creating 
smaller groups geographic separation allows for a better group identity, and thus diminishes the 
incentives to cheat on a group agreement. We have also hypothesized that introduction of an 
informal punishment mechanism (where a subject being punished does not lose anything 
financially, but is merely informed that others are not satisfied with their actions) would increase 
efficiency by lowering the defection rate on group agreements. With 7 of 8 groups showing an 
increase in efficiency once the sanctioning was introduced, we can conclude that the mechanism 
was effective. Also, the specific mechanism design proved to be effective even in the later 
rounds of the games, even though previous research shows the decrease in the effectiveness of 
informal punishment closer to the end of an experiment. 
When it comes to specific subject pools, we had two working hypothesis before the 
experiments were run. While the number of samples utilizing professionals is too small to make 
any statistically significant inferences, some behavioral observations can be made.  
First, we hypothesized that fishermen will be able to achieve higher efficiency than the 
students, simply based on their experience in a similar real-life environment. The data seem to 
offer some degree of support to this hypothesis. In the settings where communication and 
punishment were not available, the fishermen were able to achieve average efficiencies of 
between 5.65% and 19.5% higher than the students, showing that experience does matter, and 
that fishermen who are used to limiting their effort in real life tend to do the same in the lab. 
Additionally, relatively more fishermen than students were able to correctly identify that the 
optimal strategy would be to fish for less than the full available effort. As institutions became 
more complicated (communication and punishment were introduced) the difference in 
efficiencies between students and professionals became insignificant, demonstrating that 
institutions can replace experience (a case for co-management on a commons). 
Second, we hypothesized that lobstermen would be more cooperative and would achieve 
higher efficiencies in the experiment than groundfishermen. While the numbers (and limited 
sample size) do not allow us to make conclusions about the efficiencies, lobstermen clearly were 
more cooperative than groundfishermen. Any deviations from equilibrium allocation of subjects 
in the communication rounds among lobstermen were a result of a group agreement to try and 
find the way to “outsmart the system” rather than individuals’ efforts to cheat on group 
agreements. At the same time, among groundfishermen a single individual refused to 
communicate and cooperate with the others claiming “…this is not how we do it in real life. In 
real life we keep our decisions secret and do not share with the others.” Only when faced with a 
possibility of losing points (about $1 per point when converted to money) due to punishment did 
this person start cooperating. Punishment was never used among the lobstermen, indicating a 
higher degree of group identity.  
 
Evolutionary Game Theory 
Generating rules to effectively manage resources is a difficult task. Earlier analysts saw 
the problem in terms of the common property nature of fish stocks and the oceans (Hardin 1968; 
Acheson 1989). Since fish stocks are owned by no one, it is in no one’s best interest to protect 
these resources or invest in them. Under these conditions, it is only rational that one takes as 
many fish as possible as quickly as possible. Why protect a stock of herring at 0800 when 
someone else will just take them before noon?  
A more modern way of phrasing the problem is in terms of a collective-action dilemma. 
These are situations where rational action by individuals leads to disaster for a larger collectivity 
(Elster 1989; Hardin 1982; Hawkes 1992; Olson, 1965; Ostrom 1990; Taylor 1990). In 
collective-action dilemmas, it is not rational for individuals to cooperate in limiting their 
exploitive effort even though rules to conserve the resource will bring positive results for all. The 
essence of the problem is that there is a divergence between what is rational for individuals and 
what is optimal for the society. Marine fisheries present the quintessential collective action 
dilemma. It is in the self-interest of skippers to catch as many fish as possible and to resist 
establishing rules to conserve the stocks. The result, all too often, is overfishing, destruction of 
the breeding stocks, stock failure, low incomes for fishermen, and high prices for consumers. All 
skippers have acted rationally, but the result is negative for everyone. In most fisheries, effective 
conservation rules have not been developed and large numbers of fish stocks are dangerously 
overexploited. Such failures to solve the collective-action problem have been documented in 
great detail in the literature on fisheries and common property resources (Acheson 1989; 
McGoodwin 1990; Ostrom 1990). The New England groundfishery is a classic case of 
management failure. The industry has not been able to constrain exploitive effort by informal 
means, which Taylor (1990) calls a “decentralized solution.” Efforts of the government to get 
formal rules, “a centralized solution,” have been rebuffed by the industry.   
One of the most common solutions to collective-action dilemmas is to create rules to 
sanction people for behaving in ways that are not socially optimal. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
under what conditions such rules arise or what processes are involved.  
Collective-action dilemmas can be modeled as various types of games (Dixit and Skeath 
2004: 383-393). The dilemma facing those who would manage the New England groundfishery 
is thrown into sharp relief by framing the problem in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma game.  In the 
grammar of the prisoner’s dilemma game, both players have a dominant strategy, but if both 
players playing the dominant strategy they end up with a worse payoff than if they had played 
their dominated strategy.  
For heuristic purposes we have made up a set of payoff inequalities that conform to those 
required for a prisoner’s dilemma game, which are presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical Payoff Matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                                          Player 2 
 
Player 1 
 
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 5,5 1,7 
Defect 7,1 2,2 
 
If both players cooperate, both get good rewards (i.e., 5 each). If both defect, the result is 
very low payoffs (2 each). Unfortunately, if one defects and the other does not, the defector gets 
a large reward (7) and the other gets a very low payoff (1). The very high reward for defection 
motivates both players to defect.  Defect/defect is the dominant strategy. The result is that they 
get the worst of all possible total payoffs, 2 each.  In the case of some fisheries, it is rational not 
to cooperate to produce effective conservation rules. But if all players act rationally, the result is 
low total payoffs. A rule that one must cooperate (i.e., avoid the dominant strategy) results in 
higher playoffs. However, it is difficult to motivate people to cooperate. After all, it is rational to 
defect—at least in the short run (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 397-398). 
The difference between the groundfishery and the lobster industry is that the people in the 
groundfishery have not solved the prisoner’s dilemma they face; the people in the lobster fishery 
have.   The groundfishermen are behaving in a rational fashion and are playing their dominant 
strategy.  The people in the lobster industry are doing something very unusual –namely they have 
been able to play their dominated strategy, which is very difficult to do. 
 What factors have allowed the lobster industry to overcome the dilemma it faces while 
blocking the groundfishery from doing so? To answer this question, we have developed a simple 
evolutionary model that permits analysis of the changes in the industry (see Appendix 1, 
Acheson and Gardiner 2010 for an abbreviated version of this model). 
 There are two aspects of the lobster and groundfish industry historical case studies that 
are highlighted by this model. First, this is a tipping point model which has been used to predict 
the levels of cooperative behavior. If a high percentage of a population cooperates, others will 
follow; if only a few cooperate, then smaller and smaller numbers will cooperate to avoid being a 
“sucker” (Poteete et al. 2010).  It means that the payoffs to fishermen depend greatly on the 
behavior of others. If no one or only few fishermen adopt a high quality rule (strategy 0 in the 
model), then the number who will do so eventually declines.   
 In the case of the lobster industry, the model indicates that if the population starts out 
with nearly all fishermen having a pirate ethic, then evolution will lead to a population with all 
fishermen having that set of attitudes and behavior—that is the evolutionary stable strategy. If 
the population starts out with nearly all fishermen having a conservation ethic, then evolution 
will lead to a population with all fishermen having that ethic. The payoffs increase along the 
evolutionary path towards a good equilibrium. In the lobster fishery, that tipping point has been 
reached. Under these conditions, players cooperate and adhere to a high quality conservation 
practice (strategy 1 in the model). We use the same argument in the case of the V-notch practice 
in the lobster industry (Acheson and Gardiner 2011). They have escaped the prisoner’s dilemma, 
which is a difficult feat. This gives them high joint benefits (Axelrod 1984; Samuelson 2002; 
Gardner 2003; Dixit and Skeath 2004).   
 Our model and the literature on evolutionary game theory suggest it takes a major event, 
a shock to the system, to change the system from one equilibrium to another.  Key-informant 
interviews indicate the lobster bust of the 1930s was an experience that decisively shifted the 
lobster fishery to developing a conservation ethic. This devastating event convinced many in the 
industry that the wholesale violation of the existing laws was causing serious harm. There is a 
good deal of historical evidence that once the number of people adhering to the rules had reached 
a critical adoption size, then there was a cascade of others joining the effort to get better laws and 
enforce them.  Increased enforcement made it ever more risky to violate the law.  However, it is 
very important to note that this depended on a change in the culture of lobstering. Many 
fishermen would have had to be convinced that illegal behavior was detrimental to their own best 
interests; that enhancing the size of the breeding stock could be accomplished by preserving 
large females; and that V-notching gave large, joint benefits (Acheson 2003; Acheson and 
Gardner 2011). The switch from one strategy to another can happen quickly as the “evolution of 
cooperation is strongly affected by the presence of punishment” (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 
244). In short, the cost of defecting from the high-quality rule grew rapidly as the probability of 
being apprehended grew.  
No such conversion occurred in the groundfishery despite the record low levels of fish 
stocks, the increasingly tightened regulations, and numbers of boats going out of business. All of 
the evidence suggests that most groundfishermen know that stocks have been overfished. Many 
of those remaining in the industry would like to do something to conserve groundfish stocks, but 
they are unwilling to invest much. When they worked for what they considered sensible rules in 
1985, the NMFS refused to consider them. Groundfishermen do not think that the most recent 
management effort, Amendment 16, will succeed in rejuvenating the stocks. Moreover, their 
financial situation is so desperate they cannot afford to sacrifice current catches for future gains 
(Acheson 2011). 
 Second, the model indicates that fishermen have an engage in a high quality practice 
when the benefits of cooperating are higher than the benefits of staying with a poor-quality 
practice. In terms of the model, this is case 1, where b/n> c.  Only under these conditions do 
fishermen have a strong incentive to play their dominated strategy (i.e., V-notch) (see Appendix 
1, Acheson and Gardiner 2011).   
 The ethnography indicates there are several kinds of costs and benefits involved in 
adopting high quality rules.  I will use the lobster industry V-notch practice to explain these. 
First, there are benefits in terms of larger catches which are likely to materialize in the future. 
These gains come far in the future and are shared by everyone. The extent of those benefits 
depends on the proportion of fishermen who V-notch. Second, those who V-notch when 
everyone else is doing so get a benefit in terms of increased reputation. Fishermen who do not V-
notch when many others are doing so suffer some loss in reputation. Third, fishermen who V-
notch get a psychic benefit for conserving the resource by ensuring a way of life for themselves 
and their communities. Fourth, everyone who V-notches pays a cost in terms of time spent, but 
the costs are reasonably low. It only takes 30 seconds to V-notch a lobster, an average daily loss 
of 10 minutes.  Adoption of the oversize measure in the 1930s brought another set of benefits 
and costs. 
 It is always difficult to solve prisoner’s dilemmas. Unfortunately, the three most common 
explanations for why cooperation can occur in the face of a prisoner’s dilemma do not explain 
the practice of V-notching. (See Acheson and Gardner 2011 for a detailed discussion of why 
these explanations do not apply.)  
 There is a growing amount of new work on cooperation, however, that gives insight into 
the reasons that people may cooperate in the face of a prisoner’s dilemma. There are two ideas 
stemming from new work on social evolution that are helpful in explaining V-notching, one 
concerning reciprocity and the other the discount rate.  
 Axelrod (1984) argues that two factors can induce cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game in addition to rules. One of these is altruism, which involves teaching people to put the 
welfare of others ahead of purely selfish gain. Another is reciprocity. Recently other authors 
have extended these ideas in ways that help to explain the reason many fishermen V-notch 
lobsters. 
 Nowak and Sigmund make a distinction between direct reciprocity and indirect 
reciprocity, or third-party altruism. Direct reciprocity is based on the principle “You scratch my 
back and I will scratch yours,” so that both achieve a greater net benefit. Indirect reciprocity or 
third-party altruism refers to a situation in which there is no necessary reward for the people who 
help others: “You scratch my back and I will scratch someone else’s” (Nowak and Sigmund 
2005). The V-notch falls into the category of indirect reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity is 
difficult to understand. Nowak and Sigmund (2005) and Nowak (2006) stress that indirect 
reciprocity is rewarded by less tangible factors, including a reward in terms of greater reputation.  
  Gachter and Fehr (1999: 341) have found that approval incentives such as better 
reputation “alone are not sufficiently strong to cause a reduction in free-riding.” In combination 
with some minimal social familiarity, however, approval incentives generate a significant 
increase in cooperation and a reduction in free riding. Most lobstering communities have a long 
history. They are small, homogenous places with a strong sense of community. Many people in 
them know each other well. If the work of Gachter and Fehr is correct, it is in such communities 
that having a higher reputation could result in more cooperation and less free riding.  
 The discount rate, or what Axelrod (1984) calls the “shadow of the future,” can influence 
the willingness to cooperate. He says that mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is 
sufficiently important relative to the present. According to Axelrod (1984:109), “in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, the player has a short-run incentive to defect, but can do better in the long run by 
developing a pattern of mutual cooperation with the other.” However, the player will only do this 
when he or she is convinced that the discounted benefits of future cooperation to be obtained 
over time outweigh the one time immediate benefits to be had from defection (see Dixit and 
Skeath 2004). 
 There are two factors that make lobster fishermen operate with a low discount rate and 
invest in the future. First, they are convinced that conserving the breeding stock results in greater 
future catches if enough people are involved. Second, they are convinced enough fishermen are 
abiding by such high quality rules to produce those benefits. High quality rules such as the V-
notch practice involve a leap of faith. There is nothing to ensure that an egged lobster will ever 
produce eggs again, or that enough other fishermen are V-notching to increase future catches 
appreciably. If this is true, then the underlying cause of V-notching can be traced to cultural 
factors.  
There is a third possibility, which is development of a conservation ethic by changing the 
subculture of the industry. Among game theorists, the technical term for this is “social 
preferences,” where a player’s payoff no longer depends just on his or her economic result, but 
more broadly on the overall outcome. In game theory, the term “social preferences” refers to the 
concern (or lack thereof) that people have for each other’s welfare. It encompasses a wide variety 
of behaviors, including altruism, reciprocity, an interest in equality and justice, and a willingness 
to punish those who deviate from norms or laws. A review of the literature finds a growing 
number of cases where people are more cooperative than would be predicted based on games 
such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Ostrom et al. 1994; Nowak, May and Sigmund 1995; Fehr and 
Gachter 2000; Camerer 2003). Henrich and his colleagues say that “researchers from across the 
social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of 
self interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world” (Henrich et al. 2005). They go 
on to show that culture plays an important role in determining game strategies leading to 
cooperation (Henrich 2000; Henrich and Henrich 2007).  
It is possible to develop an industry sub-culture with a conservation ethic. This has 
occurred in the Maine lobster industry which has supported conservation rules and good 
enforcement, and has seen catches rise to record-high levels (Acheson and Gardner 2010). Under 
the right circumstances the groundfishery of New England might get out of its dilemma by 
following the lead of the lobster industry.   
However, as a practical matter, it would be difficult for groundfishermen to develop a 
conservation ethic because this would mean a thorough makeover of their beliefs, values and 
behavior (i.e., the culture). This can only occur if the institutional framework permits 
experimentation and allows people to accept the rules that work and reject those that do not 
(Axelrod 1986; Ostrom 1990, 1999). In the process, there is a reassessment of beliefs and 
knowledge in which new cultural values are adopted. Institutions matter and have an important 
link to beliefs and values (Boyd and Richerson 2005; Poteete et. al 2010). If the institutional 
framework is too restrictive, experimentation and learning do not take place. Unfortunately the 
groundfishery of New England finds itself enmeshed in an increasingly rigid top-down 
management system mandated by the two reauthorizations of the FCMA. These call for annual 
catch limits, stock-rebuilding timetables, mandated management techniques, and habitat 
protection closures. The kinds of cultural changes needed to develop a sense of stewardship do 
not develop in such an environment. Ostrom has pointed out that such top-down policies 
“frustrate the development of private provision of public goods,” including rules and the 
subcultures that give rise to them (Ostrom 2000a:38). 
Occasionally, opportunities have arisen which could have led to the development of a 
conservation ethic. Amendment 16, for example, which went into effect in May 2010, might 
have provided an institutional structure that could have allowed groups of groundfishermen to 
experiment. This might alter beliefs, values, and behavior and lead to a conservation ethic. 
Amendment 16 calls for sector management, with groups of fishermen receiving a quota and 
deciding among themselves the rules by which those fish would be taken (Commercial Fisheries 
News 2007). (See Acheson 2011.)  Since there is increasing evidence that groundfish stocks are 
quite localized (Ames 2004; Steneck and Wilson 2010), some groups of fishermen, including 
those involved in the Area Management Council led by Maine fisherman Craig Pendleton, 
wanted  sectors that involved discrete areas and permit banking (Snyder 2006).  The “Downeast 
Initiative,” composed of fishermen from the Stonington, Maine area, had a similar plan (Pinto 
daSilva and Kitts 2006). Such plans would have meant that a group of fishermen would be 
allocated a quota by the NEFMC and a bounded area of the ocean where they alone could fish. 
They would have been allowed to buy up permits and retire them permanently or to temporarily 
reduce fishing pressure in this bounded area. Under these conditions fishermen would have an 
incentive to conserve since they would gain all of the benefits if the fish stocks in that area 
revived. These increases in catches and income would presumably have lead to a positive 
attitude toward conservation and a willingness to enforce the rules. This could have led to a 
greater willingness to cooperate with the NEFMC.  
Unfortunately this was not to be. The NEFMC decided to impose sectors, but to allow 
fishermen to roam the American sector of the Gulf of Maine and take fish anywhere (Plante 
2010). Under these conditions, fishermen will have no incentive to constrain themselves to get 
larger future stocks; efforts to get more effective conservation rules will not be supported by 
fishermen; and the gold-rush mentality will continue. If this occurs, then actions of the 
government will have produced exactly what should be avoided—attitudes antithetical to 
conservation. It is ironic that some of the impetus for the downward spiral has been produced by 
actions of government agencies that sincerely want to conserve the fish. Development of 
stewardship and a conservation ethic depends on having the right kind of institutional 
framework.  Such a framework does not exist in the groundfishery of New England. 
We suggest that New England groundfishermen will not support government initiatives 
to manage the stocks until they develop a different sub-culture, a conservation ethic, motivating 
them to cooperate in producing effective rules. Unfortunately the day when that kind of 
cooperation is common has yet to arrive.   
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